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PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1: THE 
APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO 
RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 
POLICIES IN K–12 PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Nicole Love* 
Abstract: Schools nationwide have used race-conscious student assign-
ment policies to combat the resegregation of K–12 public schools. How-
ever, the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1 dealt a disheartening blow to school districts concerned about 
their racial diversity, holding that certain race-conscious student assign-
ment policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court applied strict scrutiny in reaching this conclusion, 
contrary to the original intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Court’s jurisprudence in desegregation cases. This Note ex-
amines the relationship between segregation, desegregation, and resegre-
gation in America’s public schools and the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
Note argues that the Court erred in analyzing the race-conscious assign-
ment policies under strict scrutiny for two reasons. First, the drafters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend for the Amendment to be “color-
blind.” Second, race-conscious assignment policies should be analyzed as 
an extension of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence, not as an exten-
sion of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. 
Introduction 
 Each autumn, children across the country prepare for a new 
school year. They gather their books, grab their lunch bags, and wave 
goodbye to summer as they head off to school. In Jefferson County, 
Kentucky, Joshua McDonald was preparing for his first day of kinder-
garten.1 Joshua and his mother Crystal Meredith had just moved into a 
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1 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2750 
(2007). 
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new school district and missed the assignment period.2 Joshua was as-
signed to attend Young Elementary, but Ms. Meredith tried to transfer 
him to Bloom Elementary, located much closer to their home.3 
 There was space available at Bloom, but her request for transfer 
was denied.4 The school’s policy on assignments was based first on the 
availability of spaces and then on racial guidelines.5 “If a school has 
reached the ‘extremes of the racial guidelines,’ a student whose race 
would contribute to the school’s racial imbalance will not be assigned 
there.”6 Bloom had reached the extremes.7 Ms. Meredith received a 
letter stating that “[t]he office of student services disapproved the 
transfer request” because of its “adverse effect on desegregation com-
pliance.”8 Joshua was not permitted to attend Bloom because of his 
race.9 The year was 2002.10 
 Similarly, across the country in Seattle, Washington, Andy Meeks 
was preparing to enter ninth grade.11 Jill Kurfirst, Andy’s mother, at-
                                                                                                                      
 
2 Id. Students are first designated a “resides” school based upon the students’ geo-
graphic locations within the district. Id. at 2749–50. Elementary schools are grouped into 
clusters to facilitate integration. Id. Each May, the district permits parents of kindergart-
ners, first-graders, and students new to the district to submit school preferences among the 
schools in the cluster. Id. at 2749. Students who do not submit a preference are assigned to 
their “resides” school. Id. 
3 Id. at 2750. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 2749–50. Jefferson County adopted a voluntary student assignment plan in 2001 
after the district court dissolved a 1975 desegregation decree. Id. at 2749; Hampton v. Jeffer-
son County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (2000). The decree was initially entered 
after a federal court, in 1973, found that Jefferson County had maintained a segregated 
school system. Hampton, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 360. It was operable in Jefferson County until 
2000, when the district court found that “the district had achieved unitary status by eliminat-
ing ‘[t]o the greatest extent practicable’ the vestiges of its prior policy of segregation.” Id. 
6 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749–50. The adopted voluntary student assignment 
plan required that all nonmagnet schools maintain a black enrollment of fifteen to fifty 
percent. Id. at 2749 (citing McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 
839–40 (W.D. Ky. 2004)). A school is deemed to have reached the “extremes” of these ra-
cial guidelines when the black enrollment is outside of this range. See id. Students may 
request transfers for any number of reasons, and may be denied because of a lack of avail-
able space or on the basis of the racial guidelines. Id. at 2750. 
7 Id. at 2750. 
8 Id.; see Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to Weigh Schools’ Racial Plans, (National Public Ra-
dio broadcast Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=6567985. 
9 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2750. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2748. 
2009] Race-Conscious School Assignment Policies & Desegregation 117 
tempted to enroll him at Ballard High School.12 The school had a spe-
cial Biotechnology Career Academy.13 Ms. Kurfirst and Andy’s teachers 
thought the smaller program and hands-on instruction would help 
Andy continue to progress, despite his attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder and dyslexia.14 The district had a policy that permitted incom-
ing ninth graders to rank the local high schools in order of prefer-
ence.15 Andy was accepted into the program and Ms. Kurfirst ranked 
Ballard first.16 Despite his acceptance into the biotechnology program, 
Andy was not permitted to attend.17 
 Ballard High School was oversubscribed, so the district employed a 
series of “tiebreakers” to determine who would be assigned to each 
school.18 Because Andy did not have any siblings attending Ballard, the 
first tiebreaker, the school administrators then considered the racial 
composition of the school and the race of the applicant, the second 
tiebreaker.19 Since Ballard was not within the district’s overall white to 
nonwhite racial balance, the district did not assign Andy because his 
race did not “serve to bring the school into balance.”20 He was denied 
assignment to Ballard High School because of race.21 The year was 
2000.22 
 Fifty years prior, in Topeka, Kansas, Linda Brown prepared for 
her third grade year at Monroe Elementary School.23 Monroe was one 
of the four elementary schools that Linda, a black student, was per-
mitted to attend.24 Topeka, like cities in seventeen other states across 
                                                                                                                      
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748. 
15 Id. at 2746–47. Seattle School District No. 1 adopted the student assignment plan at 
issue in 1998. Id. at 2746. Under the plan, incoming ninth graders rank, in order of pref-
erence, their choices of school among any of the ten high schools within the district. Id. at 
2746–47. 
16 Id. at 2748. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 2747. A school is considered oversubscribed when too many students list it as 
their first choice. Id. 
19 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2747, 2748. The third tiebreaker is the geographic 
proximity of the school to the student’s residence. Id. at 2747. 
20 Id. at 2747–48. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 2747. 
23 Paul E. Wilson, The Genesis of Brown v. Board of Education, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
7, 10, 11 (1996). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
24 See Wilson, supra note 23, at 17. 
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the country, operated a state-sanctioned segregated school district: all 
white children attended one set of schools and all black children at-
tended another.25 
 Linda’s father, Oliver Brown, wanted Linda to attend Sumner 
Elementary School, located much closer to the Brown residence.26 On 
enrollment day, Mr. Brown and Linda walked a few blocks to Sumner 
Elementary School to request that she be admitted.27 Linda waited out-
side Principal Frank Wilson’s office.28 Principal Wilson had been ex-
pecting such an encounter.29 He had been warned by Kenneth 
McFarland, the school’s superintendent, that the local NAACP chapter 
would seek to enroll black students in schools reserved for white chil-
dren.30 Principal Wilson listened politely, but immediately refused.31 
 Topeka’s Board of Education was authorized by statute to segre-
gate their public schools by race.32 Eight-year old Linda was not permit-
ted to attend the “white only” Sumner Elementary School solely be-
cause of the color of her skin.33 
 Although occurring approximately fifty years apart, Joshua, Andy, 
and Linda were all denied enrollment at the public school of their 
choice because of race.34 What distinguishes Joshua’s and Andy’s denial 
from that of Linda Brown? First, the color of their skin: Joshua and 
Andy are both white; Linda was black.35 Second, Joshua’s and Andy’s 
school assignments were made in an effort to maintain diversity in their 
schools.36 Linda’s was denied in an effort to maintain segregation.37 
                                                                                                                      
 
25 See id. at 13. 
26 See id. at 10–11. 
27 See id. at 11. 
28 Jean Van Defender, Capturing Forgotten Moments in Civil Rights History (Oral Histories), 
Brown Q. (1999), available at http://brownvboard.org/brwnqurt/03-1/03-1a.htm. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Kan. Gen. Stat. § 72–1724 (1949) (repealed 1953) (permitting, but not requir-
ing, cities with a population of more than 15,000 to maintain separate school facilities for 
black and white students); Van Defender, supra note 28; Wilson, supra note 23, at 9. 
33 See Van Defender, supra note 28; Wilson, supra note 23, at 11. 
34 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748, 2750; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 488. 
35 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2748, 2750; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 387; NAACP, Briefing 
Points: Supreme Court School Desegregation Cases, http://www.naacp.org/advocacy/ 
education/Information (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
36 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755. 
37 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 387–88. 
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 After a dramatic increase in integration during the civil rights era, 
there has been a national trend toward the resegregation of America’s 
public schools since the early 1990s.38 Segregation has adverse affects 
on the educational development of students by undermining the bene-
fits of diversity.39 However, the Supreme Court held in both Joshua’s 
and Andy’s cases that the use of race as a factor in school assignment, 
even for purposes of increased diversity, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.40 
 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”41 The landmark case of Brown v. Board of 
Education, decided in 1954, held that Sumner Elementary School’s seg-
regation was a denial of the equal protection of the laws, a violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Supreme Court ruled that school 
districts had to allow black children, and all other “children of the mi-
nority group,” to attend the same schools as white children.43 
 Similarly, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, and companion case Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Edu-
cation, both decided in 2007, the Supreme Court held that the plans of 
the two school districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using 
race as a factor in school assignment.44 The Supreme Court held that 
schools could not artificially manufacture diverse student populations 
by considering race in school assignment.45 
 Parents Involved is the latest decision in the Court’s jurisprudence 
dealing with race-conscious policies in education.46 The decision in 
                                                                                                                      
 
38 See Anurima Bhargava et al., Still Looking to the Future: Voluntary K–12 
School Integration 10–15 (2008), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/re- 
search/deseg/still_looking_to_the_future_integration_manual.pdf. 
39 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2820–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brown I, 347 U.S. at 
494–95; Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 17–22. 
40 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746, 2764 (plurality opinion). 
41 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
42 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495; Wilson, supra note 23, at 11. 
43 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. 
44 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (plurality opinion). 
45 See id. at 2746. 
46 See id. at 2738, 2746; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 
Harv. L. Rev. 131, 131 (2007). It is the third case involving race-conscious policies in edu-
cation decided in the last five years, representing a marked increase in the level of atten-
tion paid by the Court to integration and affirmative action. See generally Parents Involved, 
127 S. Ct. at 2746 (holding race-conscious assignment program unconstitutional); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003) (holding affirmative action program at University 
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Parents Involved is a continuation of the Court’s consistent disfavor of 
continued desegregation efforts and racial classifications, even when 
benign.47 Although the Court acknowledged the importance of diver-
sity in education and did not foreclose the use of race-conscious as-
signment plans, Parents Involved has “severely limited the very tools 
school districts need to achieve integration and avoid segregation.”48 
The Court’s application of strict scrutiny adopted the jurisprudence 
of “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” from affirmative action cases and 
applied it to race-conscious assignment policies.49 
 This Note argues that the Parents Involved Court should not have 
applied strict scrutiny to analyze the race-conscious student assign-
ment plans for several reasons.50 First, the Constitution is not color-
blind: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause neither 
proscribes nor compels a strict scrutiny analysis for all racial classifica-
                                                                                                                      
 
of Michigan Law School constitutional); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 250–251 (2003) 
(holding undergraduate affirmative action policy at University of Michigan unconstitu-
tional). Despite opportunities to hear other cases involving affirmative action in education, 
the Court has repeatedly declined. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st 
Cir. 2005); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). Until Grutter and Gratz were 
decided in 2003, the Supreme Court had not dealt with voluntary affirmative action in 
education for twenty-five years. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244. 
47 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738, 2746; Philip C. Aka, The Supreme Court and Af-
firmative Action in Public Education, with Special Reference to the Michigan Cases, 2006 BYU 
Educ. & L.J. 1, 69 (2006); Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown’s Goal of Edu-
cational Equality in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 175, 176 (2005); see also Adarand 
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 226 (1995) (holding that strict scrutiny applies 
when analyzing all policies that involve racial classifications, whether benign or invidious); 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 96, 98 (1995) (holding that efforts to reduce segregation 
resulting from housing segregation were beyond the scope of Court’s authority); Freeman 
v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) (holding school districts could be released from desegre-
gation decrees despite persistence of segregation in schools); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 238, 250 (1991) (holding incremental release from desegregation decrees permissible 
when the school had complied in good faith with the order, even if segregation still ex-
isted). 
48 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2738, 2755; id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. 
at 2820–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Press Release, Civil Rights Project, Court Decisions: 
Race-Conscious Admissions Policies Challenged: University Of Michigan’s Affirmative 
Action Under Fire ( June 28, 2007), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/policy/ 
court/michigan03.php. 
49 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Adarand, 
515 U.S. at 210, 239. 
50 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751–52. 
2009] Race-Conscious School Assignment Policies & Desegregation 121 
tions.51 Second, race-conscious student assignment policies should be 
analyzed as an extension of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence 
because they are distinguishable from affirmative action programs.52 
 Part I of this Note chronicles the Court’s jurisprudence on race-
conscious policies in education in four phases: desegregation, reseg-
regation, affirmative action, and the standards of review. Part II pro-
vides an overview of the Parents Involved decision as it relates to the 
strict scrutiny standard used to analyze race-conscious policies. Part III 
argues that the Court has erred in applying strict scrutiny analysis to 
the race-conscious student assignment policies at issue. 
I. Affirmative Action and Race-Conscious Assignment  
Policies: Past and Present 
A. The Evolution of Desegregation Jurisprudence 
 It was not until the Court’s 1954 landmark decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education that black citizens began to make headway toward 
equality in the wake of Plessy v. Ferguson.53 In Brown, the Court unani-
mously concluded that “in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place.”54 Segregating schools based solely 
on race violated the Equal Protection Clause because it deprived mi-
nority children of equal education opportunities.55 
 While Brown made state-imposed segregation unconstitutional, the 
Court permitted segregated schools to desegregate “with all deliberate 
                                                                                                                      
 
51 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815, 2817 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218); see, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
52 See Girardeau A. Spann, The Law of Affirmative Action 11 (2000); Deborah N. 
Archer, Moving Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Need for a More Nuanced Standard of Equal Protection 
Analysis for K Through 12 Integration Programs, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 629, 646–47 (2007). 
53 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); Aka, supra note 47, at 26–27. Holding that a Louisiana law man-
dating segregated railroad cars did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Plessy Court upheld the doctrine of “separate but equal.” See Plessy, 
163 U.S. at 544, overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. The Court stated that the purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two 
races before the law; but, “in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abol-
ish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social . . . equality . . . .” See id. 
54 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486, 495. 
55 See id. at 493. 
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speed.”56 Many school districts interpreted this as a license to continue 
segregating, at least until the mid-1960s and early 1970s.57 In fact, it was 
not until 1968, fourteen years after deciding Brown that the Court held 
that schools were required “to convert promptly to a system without a 
‘white’ school and a ‘negro’ school, but just schools.”58 
 In 1971, the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg ruled that dis-
trict courts had the authority to mandate desegregation plans.59 The 
lower courts could use racial classifications to determine student as-
signments, assuming the classifications were directly related to achiev-
ing the goal of desegregation.60 Schools could no longer satisfy Brown 
by permitting black students to attend previously “white only” schools 
but by assigning students, based on race, to separate schools.61 
 The scope of Brown was further extended in Keyes v. School District 
No. 1.62 The Keyes Court held that even in the absence of statutory seg-
regation, it would only be common sense to conclude there was a dual 
school system when “school authorities . . . carried out a systematic 
program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, 
schools, teachers, and facilities.”63 After Keyes, schools that had not op-
erated a statutory dual system could still “have an affirmative duty ‘to 
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system,’” if 
the plaintiff could prove that segregated schools existed and were 
                                                                                                                      
 
56 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (emphasis added). 
57 See Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 6. 
58 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (emphasis added). The 
Court in Green placed on the public schools the “affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary” to eliminate the effects of prior discriminatory conduct “root and 
branch.” 391 U.S. at 437–38; Kevin Brown, The Constitutionality of Racial Classifications in 
Public School Admissions, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 69 (2000). The school district’s student 
assignment plan permitting parents to choose their child’s school did not result in deseg-
regation and was unacceptable. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38. The Court required a plan 
“that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.” Id. at 439. 
59 See 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 6; Victor Goode, Af-
firmative Action and School Choice: The Courts and the Consideration of Race, 169 PLI/NY 7, 18 
(2007). 
60 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 24–25; Goode, supra note 59, at 18. Although classifications 
based solely on race typically violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court recognized 
that a student’s race must be considered to achieve integration. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 24–
25. 
61 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38); Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
62 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973); Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. 
63 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213–14; Goode, supra note 59, at 15. 
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“maintained by intentional state action.”64 By defining de jure segrega-
tion in this manner, the Court could now reach schools outside the 
South that had employed segregation policies.65 Unfortunately, this 
case also established the distinction between de jure segregation and de 
facto segregation.66 
 Some schools voluntarily chose to adopt race-conscious assignment 
plans to foster integration and to avoid mandatory court-ordered de-
segregation.67 For example, in Georgia, the Clark County Board of 
Education student assignment plan relied upon geographic attendance 
zones drawn by the district to increase racial diversity.68 Challenged by 
parents, the voluntary program was upheld in McDaniel and remains 
good law.69 
 However, by the mid-1970s the Court began to limit the scope of 
permissible desegregation efforts.70 Urban schools in Detroit, Michi-
gan, had been involved in purposeful discrimination, which resulted in 
a majority of minority students.71 The lower court’s remedy involved 
busing students from the urban Detroit districts to adjacent suburban 
school districts.72 The Supreme Court struck down this plan, holding 
that only the districts that had committed the constitutional violation 
would be ordered to remedy the segregation.73 This excluded the sub-
                                                                                                                      
 
64 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198, 203. 
65 See Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 6. School segregation can be de jure or de 
facto. Id. at 5. The Court has defined de jure segregation as “a current condition of segrega-
tion resulting from intentional state action.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205–06. The “differentiating 
factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent 
to segregate.” Id. at 208. Schools previously segregated by law have a “duty and responsibil-
ity . . . to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure 
system.” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992). Unlike de jure segregation, de facto seg-
regation does not have authority of law, but results from other influences such as housing 
patterns. Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 5. School districts are not required to attempt 
to remedy racial imbalance “when the imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de jure 
system nor to a later violation by the school district but rather to independent demo-
graphic forces.” Freeman, 503 U.S. at 493. 
66 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203. 
67 See e.g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1971). 
68 See id. at 40. 
69 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2761 
(2007) (distinguishing McDaniel as limited to instances of de jure segregation); McDaniel, 
402 U.S. at 40, 42. 
70 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974); Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 7. 
71 See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 724–26. 
72 See id. at 734; Goode, supra note 59, at 16. 
73 See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752. 
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urban districts from being involved in the remedy, effectively ending 
integration efforts in Detroit.74 
 Despite initial resistance to integration and the court-imposed 
limitations on permissible integration programs, the country saw dra-
matic increases in integration across the country.75 Unfortunately, inte-
gration may have peaked immediately following the civil rights era.76 
B. The Resegregation of America’s Public School System 
 During the civil rights era, the percentage of black students in 
white-majority schools in the South increased from two percent to 
thirty-three percent.77 The high watermark for desegregation occurred 
in the late 1980s, when forty-four percent of black students attended 
white-majority schools.78 However, in the early 1990s, the Court began 
to relax desegregation standards, initiating the resegregation of Amer-
ica’s public schools.79 
 School systems that had complied in good faith with earlier deseg-
regation orders and had eliminated, to the extent practicable, the 
traces of the prior de jure segregation were released from court supervi-
sion beginning in 1991 in Dowell.80 The following year, in Freeman v. 
Pitts, the Court authorized an incremental release from certain aspects 
of earlier imposed desegregation decrees when the district could dem-
onstrate “good-faith compliance . . . over a reasonable period of time” 
despite continuing disparities in areas such as faculty and quality of 
education.81 By 1995 the Court sought to end federal court supervision 
of desegregation orders.82 In Jenkins, the Court ruled that some racial 
                                                                                                                      
 
74 See id. 
75 See id.; Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Civil Rights Project, Racial Transfor-
mation and the Changing Nature of Segregation 13 (2006), available at http://www. 
civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/racial_transformation.pdf. 
76 See Orfield & Lee, supra note 75, at 13; Epperson, supra note 47, at 182. 
77 See Orfield & Lee, supra note 75, at 13. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; see, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 485 (1992) (holding that the “district court may re-
linquish its supervision and control over those aspects of a school system in which there 
has been compliance with a desegregation decree if other aspects of the system remain in 
noncompliance”). 
80 See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991); Bhargava et al., supra note 
38, at 9. 
81 See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 483, 485, 490, 492; Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 9. 
82 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995). 
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disparities, in areas such as academic achievement, are beyond the au-
thority of federal courts to address.83 
 The Court’s holdings in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins led to resegre-
gation for black students in all regions and at all levels: national, re-
gional, and district.84 Since the early 1990s the level of desegregation 
for black students declined to its lowest level in the last thirty years.85 In 
the 2004–2005 school year, nearly forty percent of black and Latino 
students attended schools with minority populations representing 
ninety-nine to one hundred percent of the student body as a whole.86 
In every region of the country, there were more black students attend-
ing segregated schools in 2003 than in 1988.87 Studies show a clear pat-
tern of growing racial isolation.88 
C. Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz 
 In the atmosphere of integration during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, many institutions of higher education adopted affirmative action 
admissions programs in search of a more diverse and integrated stu-
dent body.89 The Court, however, restricted such integration efforts in 
1979 when it confronted the issue of affirmative action programs in 
                                                                                                                      
 
83 See id. at 101–02. 
84 See id. at 73, 80–82, 103; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–50; 
Bhargvava et al., supra note 38, at 11; Orfield & Lee, supra note 75, at 9. 
85 See Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 10–11. 
86 Id. The face of segregation in America has also changed during this time. See Bhar-
gava et al., supra note 38, at 10; Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Civil Rights Project, 
Historic Reversals, Accelerating Resegregation, and the Need for New Integra-
tion Strategies 15–17 (2007). While segregation was historically regarded as an issue 
between black students and white students, the racial compositions of public schools in 
2007 was vastly different, with Latino students representing the largest minority group in 
public schools. Orfield & Lee, supra, at 15–16. In the late 1960s eighty percent of students 
attending public schools were white. Id. at 15. As of 2005, that percentage had dropped to 
fifty-seven percent. Id. at 16. Latino students represent the largest minority group, twenty 
percent, and black students comprise seventeen percent of our nation’s public schools. Id. 
Asians now represent eight percent of public school enrollment. Id. Overall, students of 
color currently comprise over forty percent of all U.S. public school students, more than 
double the share of students in the 1960s. See Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 10. 
87 Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 12; Orfield & Lee, supra note 86, at 16. 
88 See, e.g., Bhargava et al., supra note 38, at 11–13; Orfield & Lee, supra note 86, at 16. 
89 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); Martha S. West, The Historical Roots 
of Affirmative Action, 10 La Raza L.J. 607, 619 (1998). 
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higher education for the first time in Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke.90 
 At issue in Bakke was an affirmative action admissions program at 
the University of California at Davis Medical School.91 The school ear-
marked sixteen out of the one hundred available seats for members of 
minority groups.92 A panel convened specifically to review minority ap-
plicants to fill those sixteen seats, meaning that minority and white ap-
plicants were assessed separately.93 Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and 
Rehnquist struck down the policy as a violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act.94 Justice Powell concurred in the outcome, but wrote sepa-
rately, authoring what has become “the touchstone for constitutional 
analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”95 
 In his opinion, Justice Powell stated that that a diverse student 
body is a constitutionally-permissible goal, but he rejected rigid quo-
tas.96 His views on race-conscious policies served as the model for uni-
versities across the country.97 Undoubtedly, Justice Powell influenced 
the admissions policies of the University of Michigan Law School and 
University of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the Arts 
that came under attack in 2003.98 
 In Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, both decided in April 
2003, the Court addressed the issue of affirmative action in public 
                                                                                                                      
 
90 See 438 U.S. 265, 271 (1978). The Court was first presented with the issue of affirma-
tive action in 1974 in DeFunis v. Odegaard, but dismissed the case as moot because the 
plaintiff was already in his last year of school. See 416 U.S. 312, 316, 320 (1974); Aka, supra 
note 47, at 34. 
91 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271, 274–75 (1978). 
92 Id. at 275. 
93 See id. at 274–75. 
94 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964); see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 421 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). These justices did not address the constitutional issue of whether the 
program was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411, 421. 
95 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269. 
96 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12, 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state inter-
est encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics [than racial or 
ethnic origin].”). 
97 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269; Civil Rights Project, Joint 
Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analy-
sis of the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases 3–4 (2003) available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/policy/legal-docs/diversity_reaffirmed.pdf. 
98 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311, 323; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003); Bakke, 
438 U.S. at 269; Civil Rights Project, supra note 97, at 3–4. 
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higher education for the first time since Bakke.99 The University of 
Michigan Law School used a comprehensive approach, considering the 
candidates’ race as a “plus factor” in the holistic and “individualized 
consideration of each and every applicant.”100 The University of Michi-
gan undergraduate college, however, automatically awarded twenty 
points to underrepresented minority applicants based solely on race.101 
The twenty points had “the effect of making ‘the factor of race . . . deci-
sive’ for virtually every minimally-qualified underrepresented minority 
applicant.”102 By upholding the admissions policy of the Law School in 
Grutter and striking down the policy of the undergraduate college in 
Gratz, the Court clarified the acceptable role of affirmative action in 
higher education.103 Educational institutions are “not barred from any 
and all consideration of race when making admissions decisions.”104 In 
the context of admissions, that consideration must be flexible and indi-
vidualized as opposed to mechanistic.105 
 The Court’s decision in Grutter is particularly significant because it 
acknowledges that attaining a diverse student body is a compelling state 
interest in the context of higher education.106 Until this time, remedy-
ing past discrimination had been the only recognized justification for 
race-based governmental action.107 The Court gave significant defer-
ence to the Law School’s judgment that a diverse student body was es-
sential to its educational mission.108 The benefits of diversity were 
praised as substantial, noting that diversity promotes “cross-racial un-
derstanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [stu-
dents] to better understand persons of different races.”109 
                                                                                                                      
 
99 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 249–50; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271. 
100 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
101 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271–72. 
102 Id. 
103 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333–34, 343; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 272–74. 
104 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
105 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 337. 
106 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753 (recognizing 
Grutter’s holding that diversity in higher education is a compelling government interest). 
107 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding diversity as a compelling interest), with 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that unless classifications 
based on race are “strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions 
of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility”). 
108 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
109 See id. at 330 (internal quotations omitted). 
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 By distinguishing the policy in Gratz from that in Grutter, the Court 
carved out an acceptable form for affirmative action programs in 
higher education.110 The policy in Grutter was narrowly tailored to fur-
ther the compelling governmental interest of attaining a diverse stu-
dent body because it used race as a “plus” factor that was considered 
alongside other factors in an individual assessment of each applicant.111 
In contrast, the policy that was struck down in Gratz automatically 
awarded an underrepresented minority applicant twenty points—one-
fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission to the University.112 
This policy was too mechanistic for the Court because, by awarding 
those points, the school did not consider an applicant’s “individual po-
tential contribution to diversity.”113 
D. Strict Scrutiny Jurisprudence with Regard to Race 
 In Grutter and Gratz, the Court held that all instances of race-based 
affirmative action are to be reviewed with strict scrutiny.114 Statutes re-
stricting the exercise of fundamental rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause are “constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.”115 Although strict 
scrutiny is now the accepted constitutional standard, the Court initially 
struggled to reach that conclusion.116 For years, the Court was split on 
whether affirmative action policies should be reviewed under the same 
standard as invidious race categorizations.117 Now, not only is strict scru-
tiny the accepted standard of review, but it has evolved into a “strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact” analysis.118 Until Grutter, the Court had never 
                                                                                                                      
 
110 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 271. 
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112 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
113 See id. at 273–74 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 
(1978) (internal quotations omitted)). 
114 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
115 Adarand Constructors, v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
116 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221. 
117 Compare Adarand, 518 U.S. at 224, 226–27 (holding all racial classifications, whether 
benign or invidious, subject to review under strict scrutiny), with Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 
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intermediate standard of review). 
118 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Archer, supra note 
52, at 644 n.98; Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In Defense of Deference, 21 
Const. Comment. 133, 159 (2004). 
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upheld an affirmative action policy in the face of a strict scrutiny analy-
sis.119 
 Initially, Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine of race-based classifi-
cations was upheld in the face of Equal Protection Clause challenges 
if the classifications were “reasonable, . . . enacted in good faith for 
the promotion for the public good, and not for the annoyance or op-
pression of a particular class.”120 The Court moved away from this ra-
tional basis approach during the civil rights era.121 Laws utilizing race-
based classifications would be upheld “only if [they were] necessary, 
and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permis-
sible state policy.”122 This era of case law laid the groundwork for a 
strict scrutiny analysis.123 
 A plurality opinion in Bakke suggested that strict scrutiny was the 
proper standard of review.124 Justice Powell’s decisive fifth vote to strike 
the affirmative action program called for “the most exacting judicial 
examination,” thus implying that racial classifications should be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny.125 Some consider Bakke to be the first use 
of strict scrutiny in reviewing race-based affirmative action programs.126 
 Over the following decade, the Court could not come to a con-
sensus on the proper standard, despite some Justices’ consistent sup-
port for strict scrutiny.127 It was not until 1989 that a majority of the 
Court analyzed race-based affirmative action measures under strict 
scrutiny.128 In J.A. Croson Co., the Court held that strict scrutiny is the 
applicable standard when reviewing all governmental classifications by 
                                                                                                                      
 
119 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 118, at 159; see, 
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120 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. 
121 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding race-based policies 
subject to the “most rigid scrutiny”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA 
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122 See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196. 
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125 See id. at 291, 305 (Powell, J., concurring); Goode, supra note 59, at 23. 
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race, whether remedial or benign.129 Applying strict scrutiny, the 
Court struck down a city ordinance that obligated preference for mi-
nority business enterprises.130 The Court held that remedying societal 
discrimination was not a sufficient compelling interest under strict 
scrutiny.131 Therefore, voluntarily-adopted race-conscious remedies 
would be considered presumptively invalid.132 
 In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, decided in 1995, the Court af-
firmed and expanded the standard by holding that federal affirmative 
action programs must also be analyzed under strict scrutiny.133 Al-
though the Court acknowledged the unfortunate reality of societal dis-
crimination, it nevertheless struck down the federal affirmative action 
program.134 Since Adarand, the Court has uniformly applied the stan-
dard of strict scrutiny to racial classifications, both benign and invidi-
ous.135 
 Race-based affirmative action policies analyzed under strict scru-
tiny have almost always been held unconstitutional.136 Despite the 
Court’s insistence otherwise, a strict scrutiny review of racial classifica-
tions may indeed be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”137 In reality, only 
one affirmative action admissions program has ever survived this exact-
ing standard.138 
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130 See id. at 477–78. 
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II. Parents Involved: Race-Conscious Assignment  
Policies in K–12 Schools 
A. A Blow to Brown? 
 Parents Involved marked the first time the Court considered the 
constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious assignment policies in K–
12 schools.139 Jefferson County and Seattle School District both asserted 
that the “educational and broader socialization benefits [that] flow 
from a racially diverse learning environment” are a compelling state 
interest.140 Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the school district’s claims of 
a compelling government interest despite broad language extolling the 
benefits of diversity in Grutter.141 
 Despite a plurality of Justices striking down the policies, five of the 
Justices agreed that diversity in primary and secondary education is a 
compelling state interest.142 According to Justice Kennedy, “[i]n the 
administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it is 
permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt gen-
eral policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is 
its racial composition.”143 Justice Breyer posits, “[i]f an educational in-
                                                                                                                      
 
139 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2754 
(2007); Epperson, supra note 47, at 212. Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, did not 
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143 See id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
132 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:115 
terest that combines [remedial, educational, and democratic] elements 
is not ‘compelling,’ what is?”144 
 By striking down such policies, the Court severely limited the abil-
ity of elementary and secondary schools to adopt integration initiatives 
voluntarily.145 Upholding a similar policy, the Massachusetts District 
Court stated that 
[t]o say that school officials in the K–12 grades, acting in good 
faith, cannot take steps to remedy the extraordinary problems 
of de facto segregation and promote multiracial learning, is to 
go further than ever before to disappoint the promise of 
Brown. It is to admit that in 2003, resegregation of the schools 
is a tolerable result, as if the only problems Brown addressed 
were bad people and not bad impacts.146 
In 2003 the Massachusetts court understood that to strike down race-
conscious student assignment policies would be contrary to Brown; yet 
in 2007 the Supreme Court’s holding that schools cannot voluntarily 
adopt race-conscious assignment policies for the purpose of increas-
ing integration has rendered the promise of Brown unfulfilled.147 
B. Standard of Review: “Strict in scrutiny, but fatal in fact” 
 The Parents Involved plurality disagreed with Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent as to the proper standard of review for race-conscious assignment 
policies.148 This is not surprising given the Court’s history of debate 
and disagreement on the issue.149 Despite no majority holding, five 
Justices analyzed the race-conscious assignment policies with strict 
scrutiny.150 
                                                                                                                      
 
144 See id. at 2823, 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
145 See id. at 2746 (plurality opinion); id. at 2833–34 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality, affirmed strict scru-
tiny as the proper standard of review.151 Citing Adarand, Grutter, and 
Gratz, the Court held, “the school districts must demonstrate that the 
use of individual racial classifications in the assignment plans here un-
der review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government 
interest.”152 The Court simply accepted the standard as well-established, 
reflecting a color-blind interpretation of the Constitution.153 Justice 
Roberts made his opinion clear, stating “[t]he way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”154 
 Justice Thomas, endorsing a strict scrutiny analysis, repeatedly 
criticized Justice Breyer’s approval of race-conscious assignment poli-
cies because such policies undermine the requirements of a color-
blind Constitution.155 Likewise, Justice Kennedy saw no need to de-
fend the strict scrutiny standard, merely stating, “[t]hese plans classify 
individuals by race and allocate benefits and burdens on that basis; 
and as a result, they are to be subjected to strict scrutiny.”156 However, 
Justice Breyer’s dissent explicitly denied that “Adarand, Gratz, and 
Grutter, or any other—has ever held that the test of ‘strict scrutiny’ 
means that all racial classifications—no matter whether they seek to 
include or exclude—must in practice be treated the same.”157 
 Instead, Justice Breyer proposed a “contextual approach” to scru-
tiny.158 Justice Breyer cited Grutter for the proposition that “[c]ontext 
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”159 He reasoned that the Court should not 
treat dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were equally objec-
tionable because the context at issue in Parents Involved aims to increase 
diversity, does not stigmatize or exclude, and does not impose burdens 
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criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection of the color-blind Constitution.”). 
156 Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
157 Id. at 2817 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dissent, faulted the plurality’s strict scrutiny standard and asserted that “a rigid adherence 
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159 See id. at 2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter,  539 U.S. at 327 (2003)). 
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unfairly upon members of one race.160 Race-conscious assignment pro-
grams can be distinguished from the other contexts where one or more 
of these negative features were present.161 
 Justice Breyer agreed that race-conscious programs need to be ex-
amined carefully, but that “the law requires application here of a stan-
dard of review that is not ‘strict’ in the traditional sense of that 
word.”162 By failing to consider context, he reasoned, the plurality mis-
interpreted the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue and transformed 
“the ‘strict scrutiny’ test into a rule that is fatal in fact across the 
board.”163 
III. The Court Erred in Applying Strict Scrutiny 
A. The Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment Does  
Not Support Application of Strict Scrutiny 
 Application of strict scrutiny in the context of race-conscious as-
signment policies is inconsistent with the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment.164 Although the Fourteenth Amendment is consis-
tently heralded as “the cornerstone of color-blind constitutionalism,” its 
origins show that it is far from color-blind.165 Despite Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s contemporary argument that “[t]he 14th Amendment prevents 
states from according differential treatment to American children on 
the basis of color or race,” the Reconstruction Congress passed the 
Fourteenth Amendment with the specific intent of aiding Blacks and 
creating equality.166 Holding that the Constitution is color-blind and 
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applying strict scrutiny to race-conscious student assignment policies, 
the Parents Involved Court incorrectly ignored the historical context in 
which the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted.167 
 The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted primarily for the protec-
tion of Blacks.168 The Reconstruction Congress intended to incorporate 
“blacks into the civic, economic, and political mainstream in American 
society,” not to prohibit race-conscious measures adopted to further 
that end.169 At the time, only state actions that discriminated against 
Blacks would come within the Amendment’s purview.170 
 The historical context in which the Amendment was enacted re-
veals the “true spirit and meaning of the amendments.”171 The Recon-
struction Congress diligently sought to enact race-conscious legislation 
in pursuit of equality.172 In the years immediately preceding the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, race-conscious legislation 
for the benefit of Blacks.173 In enacting this legislation, Congress spe-
cifically sought to aid the integration of Blacks into white society.174 
 Congressman Bingham, who would later author the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, did not object to the racial 
distinctions in the Freedmen’s Bureau Act.175 Objectors argued that the 
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“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1866 itself contained facially race-conscious provisions to guar-
antee enforcement of civil rights for blacks.” Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 23; 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
174 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, 
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; Strasser, supra note 169, at 338. 
175 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 
Stat. 173; Saunders, supra note 167, at 279; Schnapper, supra note 166, at 777. In consider-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction rejected a pro-
posed amendment providing that “[a]ll laws, state or national, shall operate impartially 
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bill only benefited Blacks to the detriment of whites, but proponents of 
the bill emphasized that the distinctions were entirely proper.176 The 
Freedmen’s Bureau was formed both to assist Blacks in bettering their 
own position and to provide relief, but not to discriminate unfairly.177 
 Congress believed this legislation to be so important that after 
President Andrew Johnson’s first veto, it passed a new version of the bill 
that contained four additional race-conscious provisions.178 Although 
again vetoed by the President, the House and the Senate voted to over-
ride, creating the Freedmen’s Bureau.179 That the Acts were passed de-
spite explicit objections to the enactment of legislation specifically 
drafted for the benefit of Blacks provides even greater support for the 
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to be 
color-blind.180 
 Meanwhile, the President had also vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.181 President Johnson believed that the Act provided for Blacks at 
the expense of white citizens.182 Nevertheless, Congress voted to over-
ride the President’s veto, enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866.183 
 The history and debate surrounding the enactment of this legisla-
tion provide strong evidence that Congress “could not have intended 
[the Fourteenth Amendment] generally to prohibit affirmative action 
for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.”184 Numerous history schol-
ars believe Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment to “ensure the 
                                                                                                                      
 
and equally on all persons without regard to race or color.” See Saunders, supra note 167, at 
276. Also, by a vote of seven to thirty-eight, the following amendment was rejected: “That 
no State . . . shall, by any constitution, law, or other regulation whatever . . . make or en-
force in any way, or in any manner recognize any distinction between citizens . . . on ac-
count of race or color or previous condition of slavery.” Saunders, supra note 167, at 276 
n.135. 
176 See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; Schnapper, supra 
note 166, at 756, 764, 766, 767, 774. 
177 Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; see Schnapper, supra 
note 166, at 768. 
178 See Schnapper, supra note 166, at 769, 771–72. 
179 See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; Cong. Globe, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1287, 3842, 3850 (1866); Schnapper, supra note 166, at 775. 
180 See Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, Schnapper, supra 
note 166, at 756, 764, 766, 767, 774. 
181 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; 8 Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents 3610–11 (1914); Schnapper, supra note 166, at 771. 
182 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Schnapper, supra note 166, at 771. 
183 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Schnapper, supra note 166, at 771. 
184 Schnapper, supra note 166, at 754.; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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constitutionality of these two statutes and to write them into the fabric 
of the Constitution.”185 It would be incongruous to conclude that Con-
gress would adopt such remedial legislation—the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866—while simultaneously enacting a 
color-blind Amendment.186 
 Another concern of the Reconstruction Congress was public edu-
cation.187 Contrary to the plurality’s recent holding in Parents Involved, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as originally intended, did not bar states 
and localities from engaging in voluntary integration efforts.188 Many 
members of Congress actually supported race-conscious school policies 
in several states within a year of enacting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.189 In total, the Freedman’s Bureau was involved in the establish-
ment or support of 4300 schools of all levels.190 
 From 1868 to 1887, while states were enacting race-conscious legis-
lation to pursue integration, there were no constitutional challenges.191 
As a time when the level of federal monitoring of state action was ex-
tremely high, Congress was aware of the states’ use of race-conscious 
criteria and did not did not take any action that would express con-
                                                                                                                      
 
185 Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 18; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 
Stat. 173. 
186 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July 16, 
1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173; Schnapper, supra note 166, at 789, 791. 
187 See David Tyack & Robert Lowe, The Constitutional Moment: Reconstruction and Black 
Education in the South, 94 Am. J. of Educ. 236, 237 (1986). 
188 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746 (plurality opin-
ion); Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 6. 
189 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 6; Brief for 
Historians of the Civil Rights Era William H. Chafe et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 7, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05–908) [hereinafter Brief for 
Historians of the Civil Rights Era]. 
190 See Brief for Historians of the Civil Rights Era, supra note 189, at 7. For example, 
Congress incorporated and funded Howard University and Berea College, both utilizing 
policies focused on desegregation. See Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 12. Although 
the final version of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 did not include a mandatory school inte-
gration provision, as advocated by some members of Congress, several states took note of 
the congressional support and passed legislation integrating their schools. See Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 8, 11. From 1866 to 
1887 Rhode Island, Michigan, Connecticut, New York, Nevada, Illinois, California, Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Ohio adopted legislation to integrate 
schools. See id. at 8, 11. 
191 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879); Brief for Historians, supra 
note 166, at 12. 
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cern.192 Thus, Congress impliedly affirmed the states’ use of racial con-
siderations in pursuing the goal of integration.193 
 In his Parents Involved dissent, Justice Breyer recognized this origi-
nal understanding: the legal principle “that the government may volun-
tarily adopt race-conscious measures to improve conditions of race even 
when it is not under a constitutional obligation to do so” is predicated 
upon this “well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment.”194 
He acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause does not require 
that minorities and non-minorities be treated the same when remedying 
distinct disadvantages.195 And the Fourteenth Amendment does not re-
quire that the two be treated differently in pursuit of equality.196 
Through its application of strict scrutiny, and its effectual per se pro-
scription to race-conscious measures, the Court has undermined the 
fundamental remedial objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment.197 Ap-
plication of strict scrutiny to race-conscious student assignment plans is 
at odds with the legislative intent of the Reconstruction Congress.198 
B. Desegregation and Affirmative Action Are Distinct and Separate Categories 
 The Court’s desegregation jurisprudence affirms the considera-
tion of race in desegregating public schools.199 Since race-conscious 
                                                                                                                      
 
192 Brief for Historians, supra note 166, at 12. 
193 See id. 
194 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2814, 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970)). 
195 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Af-
firmative Action, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 51, 72 (1996). 
196 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; Simmons, supra note 195, at 72. 
197 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815, 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Simmons, 
supra note 195, at 82. 
198 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring); Schnapper, supra note 166, at 789, 791. 
199 See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (“Just as the race 
of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has oc-
curred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.”); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 
(“School authorities . . . might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare stu-
dents to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to 
white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.”); see also Parents In-
volved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811–12, 2817–18, 2834–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for the 
NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 9, 10, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05–908) [hereinafter Brief for 
NAACP]. 
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assignment policies are extensions of desegregation policies and distin-
guishable from affirmative action programs, the Court erred in apply-
ing the strict scrutiny standard from affirmative action jurispru-
dence.200 Constitutional challenges to desegregation policies and 
affirmative action programs are based on the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.201 Despite this commonality, the Court 
has appropriately analyzed desegregation cases differently from cases of 
affirmative action.202 The harms associated with merit-based selection 
processes in affirmative action cases, used to justify the use of strict 
scrutiny, are not present in cases of desegregation or race-conscious 
student assignment policies.203 Therefore, race-conscious student as-
signment policies should be analyzed consistently with desegregation 
case precedent.204 
                                                                                                                      
 
200 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2809, 2817, 2818, 2831–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Brief for Historians of the Civil Rights Era, supra note 189, at 21, 22; Archer, supra note 52, 
at 647–48. 
201 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Dis-
crimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 83 (1995); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 476–77 (1989); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I ), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
202 Compare McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (“The Clarke County Board of 
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lines.”), with Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold today 
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127 S. Ct. at 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief for NAACP, supra note 199, at 5–6; 
Archer, supra note 52, at 639; Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 277, 311 
(2007). 
203 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Peter J. Rubin, Re-
connecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and 
Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 20–22 (2000). Rubin identifies five harms that may accompany 
the use of racial classifications of historically disadvantaged groups; (1) the risk that racial 
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other than racial hostility”; (2) risk that race is used to “reward the members of (at least 
ordinarily) one’s own racial group,” leaving members of the “out group” to feel they are 
less than full members of the polity; (3) risk that race “is being used for reasons that reflect 
nothing more than erroneous stereotypes”; (4) risk that the use of race “may perpetuate a 
negative racial stereotype”; (5) risk that decisions based on race may “deny a person treat-
ment as an individual in a way that other sorting mechanisms do not.” Rubin, supra, at 20–
22. Opponents of affirmative action criticize such programs because they allocate re-
sources to minorities and harm “innocent whites” by replacing the concept of merit with 
quotas. Spann, supra note 201, at 12. 
204 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2811–12, 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); McDaniel, 
402 U.S. at 41; Archer, supra note 53, at 639; Kevin G. Welner, K–12 Race-Conscious Student 
Assignment Policies: Law, Social Science, and Diversity, 76 Rev. Educ. Res. 349, 366–69 (2006). 
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 However, in analyzing the race-conscious assignment policies in 
Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts cited prior affirmative action 
cases for the proposition that all racial classifications are subject to strict 
scrutiny.205 Despite stressing that “[c]ontext matters” when analyzing 
racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, the Parents In-
volved Court ignored the distinction between desegregation and af-
firmative action in race-conscious policy precedent.206 By disregarding 
this distinction and applying strict scrutiny to the race-conscious as-
signment policies in Parents Involved, the Court inappropriately con-
flated two distinct lines of cases: desegregation cases and affirmative 
action cases.207 
1. Prior to Parents Involved, Desegregation Cases Have Never Been 
Analyzed with Strict Scrutiny 
 The Court has never applied strict scrutiny in the context of school 
desegregation.208 The unanimous Brown Court did not apply “rigid 
scrutiny” in analyzing the constitutionality of the segregation policy, 
despite the Court’s previous declaration in Korematsu v. United States 
that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect” and are subject to “the most rigid scru-
tiny.”209 From the landmark desegregation case of Brown to Missouri v. 
Jenkins, the Court never referenced, implied, or held that strict scrutiny 
would be the appropriate standard of review in desegregation cases.210 
 Before Parents Involved, the Court’s history of applying strict scru-
tiny to racial classifications in educational policies had been appropri-
                                                                                                                      
 
205 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2751–52 (plurality opinion) (citing Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003), Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 537 (1980)). 
206 See id. at 2754 (plurality opinion) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327); id. at 2817–18 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327). 
207 See id. at 2761–65 (plurality opinion); id. at 2817–18 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief 
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tion policies); see also Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief 
for NAACP, supra note 199, at 5–6; Archer, supra note 52, at 648. 
209 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(upholding government policy that required the internment of Japanese-Americans). 
210 See generally Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 73; McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 40; Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486. 
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ately confined to affirmative action cases.211 The affirmative action 
cases “dealt not with the constitutional viability of integrative, race-
conscious public school student assignments, but instead with policies 
and programs that considered race among other factors in the distribu-
tion of what the Court deemed to be legally cognizable burdens and 
benefits.”212 
 Affirmative action policies were initially introduced in the context 
of employment, requiring government contractors to take affirmative 
action to eliminate the use of race considerations in hiring decisions.213 
Such affirmative action programs are criticized because they “can foster 
a sense that, without help, its beneficiaries are unable to compete.”214 
This is because these selection processes involve the distribution of a 
limited resource.215 In distributing those resources, the institutions en-
gage in a merit-based competition.216 Because selection is merit-based, 
                                                                                                                      
 
211 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311, 326 (applying strict scrutiny to law school admis-
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Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 
(Sept. 24, 1965); West, supra note 89, at 613. Executive Order 11,246 required “equal op-
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11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965). 
214 See Rubin, supra note 203, at 33. 
215 See Archer, supra note 52, at 639; Welner, supra note 204, at 366–67. 
216 See Archer, supra note 52, at 653; Liu, supra note 202, at 300; Welner, supra note 204, 
at 366–67. This competition is a zero-sum game: an applicant is either admitted or re-
jected. See Archer, supra note 52, at 652; Welner, supra note 204, at 366–67. In this context, 
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rejection carries a stigma.217 That stigma may burden white and minor-
ity students alike.218 It is the possibility of this stigma resulting from se-
lection (or non-selection) that triggers strict scrutiny analysis in af-
firmative action cases.219 
 Although Gratz, Grutter, and Bakke all dealt with race-conscious 
policies in education, they are not desegregation cases; they are clear 
affirmative action cases.220 Selection into a college, university, or gradu-
ate program is a merit-based decision.221 Just as an employer has lim-
ited hiring needs, a university only has a limited enrollment; therefore, 
the number of available spots is a limited resource.222 The Massachu-
setts District Court recognized this difference when it upheld a student 
race-conscious assignment policy in Comfort v. Lynn School Committee.223 
Even though the K–12 schools throughout the district offered varying 
academic programs, the education at each school for any given level 
was comparable.224 However, 
this is not a case, as in Adarand, Bakke, or Grutter, in which the 
[school district], in the distribution of limited resources, gives 
preference to some persons on the basis of race. Students like 
the plaintiffs may not be able to attend the specific school 
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652; Welner, supra note 204, at 366–67. 
217 See Liu, supra note 202, at 300; Welner, supra note 204, at 366–67. 
218 See Rubin, supra note 203, at 38, 39; Spann, supra note 201, at 311; Welner, supra 
note 204, at 366. 
219 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1194 
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220 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2817, 2818–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311, 314–17, 329 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–50, 
256 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 274–75 (1977); Spann, supra 
note 52, at 3. 
221 See Archer, supra note 52, at 653; Welner, supra note 204, at 367. 
222 See Archer, supra note 52, at 652. 
223 See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215 (D. Mass. 2003). The dis-
trict court distinguished Adarand’s affirmative action program, where “the Court subjected 
a racial classification to strict scrutiny,” from Lynn’s race-conscious assignment policies, 
where race is merely considered but “no preference is given to members of one race over 
another.” See id. at 244–45 (citing Adarand 515 U.S. at 204). The district court further 
noted that other courts have similarly held that “where differential treatment does not 
favor members of one race over another, there is no racial classification, Adarand is inap-
posite, and strict scrutiny does not apply.” See id. at 244. 
224 See id. at 245. 
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they want, but no student is advantaged over another on the 
basis of race.225 
 In contrast, primary and secondary public education is not a lim-
ited resource distributed on the basis of merit.226 Because attendance is 
compulsory for all K–12 students, school assignment is fundamentally a 
sorting process.227 As a sorting process, assignment decisions “do not 
reflect judgments about the merit, qualifications, or talents of individ-
ual children.”228 When viewed in this manner, “there is no risk, as there 
is in the context of affirmative action, that a government body taking 
account of race is acting on the basis of a belief that blacks are less able 
than whites or inherently in need of assistance.”229 So, while a student 
may not be assigned to his or her first choice K–12 school, assignment 
to a second or third choice school does not carry the same stigma as 
rejection from a position awarded on the basis of merit.230 
 One instructive comparison for this race-conscious sorting process 
is electoral redistricting.231 While districting policies are not completely 
analogous to parental choice plans, both are essentially non-merit 
based sorting processes.232 As such, there is no stigma attached to selec-
tion or non-selection in either context.233 In cases of electoral redistrict-
ing, strict scrutiny is not applied unless “race was the predominant fac-
tor motivating the legislature’s decision.”234 Despite the command of 
Adarand that all racial classifications automatically be analyzed under 
strict scrutiny, the sorting process of electoral redistricting proves that 
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226 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2918–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Parents Involved, 
426 F.3d at 1181; Comfort, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Brief for Respondents at 5, Meredith v. 
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228 See Liu, supra note 202, at 300. 
229 See Rubin, supra note 203, at 39. 
230 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2818 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Parents Involved, 426 
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this is not the case.235 Similarly, the sorting policies at issue in Parents 
Involved should not have been subject to strict scrutiny.236 
2. Deference: Desegregation Jurisprudence 
 In desegregation cases the Court has shown great deference to lo-
cal school authorities and has emphasized the discretionary authority 
of local school boards in matters of educational policy setting.237 These 
cases have stood for the principle that schools can adopt voluntary race-
conscious policies to remedy de facto discrimination.238 The Court’s cur-
rent “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” approach, used to invalidate vol-
untary race-conscious assignment policies in K–12 schools, is inconsis-
tent with “[a] longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority” 
endorsing this principle.239 
 In support, Justice Breyer cited the Court’s continued deference 
to the authority of local school boards dating back to Brown.240 The 
Court has repeatedly recognized the broad authority of local schools 
in formulating and implementing educational policies.241 It has long 
been observed that “local autonomy of school districts is a vital na-
tional tradition.”242 
 In Swann, the Court held that district courts were authorized to 
mandate desegregation policies, but that their authority was limited to 
situations where schools had first failed to meet their obligation to 
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241 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16; N.C. Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 45. 
242 See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 
410 (1977)). 
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desegregate.243 Even after lower courts found that the board had 
failed to meet its obligation, the board was still able to choose which 
of three policies to adopt, or to come forward with a new plan of its 
own.244 This principle has been accepted by lower courts and the fed-
eral government.245 The Court emphasized that “[n]o single tradition 
in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 
operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for pub-
lic schools and to quality of educational process.”246 
 The “resegregation” cases beginning in the 1990s relied upon 
this principle in lifting desegregation orders, despite findings of de 
facto desegregation.247 Because of the value placed upon local control 
of educational decisions, the Court intended not only “to remedy the 
violation” of the Equal Protection Clause but also “to restore state and 
local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in 
compliance with the Constitution.”248 Releasing school districts from 
portions of desegregation decrees, but not others, the Court stated 
that “[p]artial relinquishment of judicial control . . . can be an impor-
tant and significant step in fulfilling the district court’s duty to return 
the operations and control of schools to local authorities.”249 
 Moreover, recognizing the authority of local school boards, the 
Court has previously encouraged, not condemned, voluntary action to 
remedy both de jure and de facto discrimination.250 Although a federal 
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court cannot intervene where a district has eliminated the vestiges of de 
jure segregation (while de facto segregation still exists), a school district 
is not so limited.251 In Keyes, Justice Powell specifically stated that 
“[s]chool boards would, of course, be free to develop and initiate fur-
ther plans to promote school desegregation” beyond what the court has 
ordered because “[n]othing in this opinion is meant to discourage 
school boards from exceeding minimal constitutional standards in 
promoting the values of an integrated school experience.”252 This 
statement makes clear that the Court did not intend to limit a local 
school district’s authority to remedy de facto segregation.253 
 Prior to Parents Involved, the Court had never addressed the consti-
tutionality of voluntary race-conscious assignment policies in K–12; 
however, an illustrative case on this matter involved the same school 
district more than two decades earlier.254 In Washington v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment could be 
used to defend a mandatory busing program from attack by the 
State.255 The Seattle school board voluntarily adopted a busing pro-
gram to reduce racial isolation in district schools.256 In response, a 
community organization called Citizens for Voluntary Integration 
Committee (CiVIC) opposed the plan by drafting Initiative 350, en-
acted in 1978.257 The Initiative’s sole purpose was to make illegal man-
datory busing for purposes of integration.258 The Court held Initiative 
350 unconstitutional because it served to “[disadvantage] those who 
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would benefit from laws barring” de facto desegregation.259 Moreover, 
the Initiative undermined the school board— “those who . . . would 
otherwise regulate student assignment decisions” —and it “[burdened] 
all future attempts to integrate Washington schools in districts 
throughout the State.”260 The Court stated that “in the absence of a 
constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school desegre-
gation are matters to be resolved through the political process.”261 
 Although the Court analyzed Initiative 350’s constitutionality, not 
that of the voluntary busing program, it noted that decisions about 
such programs were squarely within the authority of the local school 
boards.262 This meant that Seattle could continue its voluntary race-
conscious assignment policy, even though such a program could not 
have been ordered by a federal court.263 Therefore, the Court implied 
that race-conscious policies adopted by a school board, even in the ab-
sence of de jure segregation, were permissible.264 
 Washington was decided just four years after Bakke, yet the Court 
made no mention of affirmative action, nor did it question the consti-
tutionality of Seattle’s race-conscious assignment policy.265 At no time 
when addressing issues of desegregation had the Court treated the 
issue as one of affirmative action.266 By contradicting the principle 
that school officials have greater authority to foster racially integrated 
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student bodies than federal courts, the Parents Involved Court broke 
long-standing, clear precedent.267 
Conclusion 
 The Parents Involved Court had the opportunity to affirm the 
promise of Brown v. Board of Education and to provide to all students the 
opportunity to learn in a racially-diverse environment. Instead, the Par-
ents Involved plurality took the harsh position that integration and racial 
diversity, and the benefits that flow from that diversity, cannot be pur-
sued voluntarily by local school districts. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court mistakenly applied the strict scrutiny standard of review. 
 Applying strict scrutiny conflicts with the original intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; application of a “fatal in fact” standard of 
analysis is inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. It unneces-
sarily and inappropriately conflated the Court’s affirmative action and 
desegregation jurisprudence by failing to account for the relevant dif-
ferences between the K–12 sorting assignment policies and merit-
based selection affirmative action programs. By applying strict scru-
tiny, the Court disregarded the context of K–12 schools and failed to 
give the proper deference, as compelled by precedent established in 
desegregation case law, to the authority of local school boards. 
 The Court’s ruling in Parents Involved has taken from schools “the 
instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation, 
instruments that they believe are needed to overcome the problems 
of cities divided by race and poverty.”268 The Parents Involved plurality 
is best summarized by Justice Breyer in his dissent. Speaking of the 
plurality that held the policies unconstitutional, he wrote: 
It misapplies the relevant constitutional principles, it an-
nounces legal rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local 
governments to deal effectively with the growing resegrega-
tion of public schools, it threatens to substitute for present 
calm a disruptive round of race related litigation, and it un-
dermines Brown’s promise of integrated primary and secon-
dary education that local communities have sought to make a 
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reality. This cannot be justified in the name of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.269 
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